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District Court Review of Findings of Fact Proposed by
Magistrates: Reality Versus Fiction
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.1
Magistrates have become an indispensable and ubiquitous part of the
federal judicial system.2 District judges can assign to magistrates the tasks of
conducting hearings and making proposed findings with respect to a wide
variety of civil and criminal matters. The Magistrates Act of 1968 confers
this power subject to the district judge’s duty to “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings
or recommendations to which objection is made.”3 Given their increasingly
large caseloads, district judges make extensive use of this mechanism, often
in circumstances in which the findings are determinative of the outcome of a
case.4
The use of magistrates to make proposed findings of fact that have the
potential to be outcome determinative raises two constitutional concerns.
First, since magistrates are not judges within the meaning of Article III, their
use to make outcome-determinative proposed findings of fact arguably
violates Article III. Second, when a district court decides to uphold or reject
1
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For descriptions of the increasingly important roles of magistrates, see generally Kevin Koller,
Deciphering De Novo Determinations: Must District Courts Review Objections Not Raised Before a
Magistrate Judge? 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1557 (2011); Leslie Fochio, A History of the Development of the
Office of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 Fed. Courts L.Rev. 4 (1999).
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a magistrate’s proposed finding without conducting an evidentiary hearing,
the court arguably violates due process. The Supreme Court addressed both
issues in its 1980 decision in United States v. Raddatz.5 The Court held that
the use of magistrates to make outcome-determinative proposed findings is
consistent with Article III because “the magistrate acts subsidiary to and
only in aid of the district court,” “the entire process takes place under the
district court’s total control and jurisdiction,” and “the statute grants the
judge broad discretion to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate’s proposed
findings.”6
The Court concluded that “in providing for a ‘de novo determination,’
rather than de novo hearing, Congress intended to permit whatever reliance
a district judge, in the exercise of his sound judicial discretion chose to place
on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.”7 The Court then
held that due process does not require a district judge to conduct a hearing if
he decides to adopt a magistrate’s proposed finding even when that finding
has the effect of virtually ensuring that a criminal defendant will be
convicted.8 The Court added a footnote,9 however, that has been the source
of a great deal of litigation:

5

447 U.S. 667 (1980).
Id. at 680-81.
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[W]e assume it is unlikely that a district judge would reject a
magistrate’s findings on credibility when those findings are
dispositive and substitute the judge’s own appraisal; to do so without
seeing and hearing the witnesses whose credibility is in question could
well give rise to serious questions which we do not reach.

The Court’s assumption has proven to be unfounded—district judges often
reject findings proposed by magistrates without conducting a new oral
evidentiary hearing, thereby requiring circuit courts to address the questions
the Court did not reach.
Six circuits have held that a district judge cannot reject a magistrate’s
proposed outcome-determinative finding without conducting a new
evidentiary hearing when the result is likely to be conviction of a criminal
defendant.10 The courts have announced that holding in the context of
findings that a guilty plea was voluntary,11 that a defendant consented to a
search,12 that a law enforcement officer had probable cause to conduct a

9

Id at 681 n. 7.
United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 443 F.3d 138, 148 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Ridgeway,
300 F.3d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303, 1306 (11 th Cir. 2001); Cullen
v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 1999); Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 482 (3d Cir. 1995); Louis v.
Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1109 (5 th Cir. 1980).
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search,13 that a prosecutor used race as a factor in objecting to jurors in a
criminal case,14 and that a criminal defendant’s lawyer provided ineffective
assistance.15 All of those holdings were announced in the context of a
criminal defendant’s objection to a district judge’s rejection of a magistrate’s
proposed finding that was favorable to the defendant. All were based on the
courts’ application of the due process clause. That reliance on due process
would seem to be essential, given the Supreme Court’s holding in Raddatz
that Congress had an “unmistakeable” intent to confer on district judges
discretion to reject findings proposed by magistrates without conducting a
new evidentiary hearing.16
Until June 2012, all of the holdings that district judges could not reject
magistrates’ proposed findings without conducting a new hearing were
based on due process and were limited to the context of district court
rejection of a magistrate’s proposed finding that was favorable to a criminal
defendant. In United States v. Thoms,17 however, the Ninth Circuit
broadened the scope of its prior holding by applying it to a district judge’s
rejection of a proposed finding that was favorable to the government. Since
due process does not apply in such a context, the court could not rely on
13
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constitutional reasoning to support its new, much broader holding. It based
its new broader rule on its power “to mandate procedures deemed desirable
from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in no wise
commanded by statute or by the constitution.”18 The court concluded that
“all litigants” have a right to a new hearing before a district judge can reject
a magistrate’s proposed finding that is favorable to the litigant.19
If it is adopted by other circuits or upheld by the Supreme Court, the
Ninth Circuit’s broad prohibition on district court rejection of a magistrate’s
proposed finding without conducting a new hearing will have major effects
on the relationship between district judges and magistrates in all contexts,
including reversal of proposed findings favorable to the government and
reversal of proposed findings made in civil cases. In this article, I argue that
the broad restriction on the power of district judges announced by the Ninth
Circuit in Thoms is indefensible. In section I, I argue that even the preexisting restriction on the power of district judges to reject proposed findings
favorable to criminal defendants is based on an erroneous interpretation and
application of the due process clause. In section II, I argue that the new
broad restriction on the power of district judges violates both Article I and
18

Id. at 903. The court recognized one exception to the rule it announced. The exception applies “where the
district judge finds that the magistrate judge’s credibility determinations had no sufficient evidentiary basis,
so that, were they jury determinations, judgment as a matter of law would issue for the defendant.” Id. at
903.
19
Id. at 900.
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Article III of the Constitution. In section III, I use Supreme Court decisions
issued in the context of administrative law to demonstrate that the circuit
court restrictions on the relationship between district judges and magistrates
is inconsistent with the principles and reasoning the Supreme Court has long
used as the basis for its decisions that govern both the relationship between
agencies and courts and the relationship between Administrative Law Judges
(ALJ) and agencies. In section IV, I urge courts to adopt a legal regime
governing the relationship between district judges and magistrates that is
based on the approach the Fifth Circuit took in United States v. Marshall 20
and the approach the Supreme Court has long required all courts to take in
the analogous context of the relationship between ALJs and agencies.

I. The Pre-Thoms De Novo Hearing Requirement Is Not Supported by
Due Process

Each of the pre-Thoms circuit court opinions that restricted the power
of district judges to reject findings proposed by magistrates was based on the
courts’ conclusions that such a rejection violates due process when the judge
rejects a magistrate’s proposed finding that is favorable to a criminal

20

609 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980).
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defendant without conducting a new evidentiary hearing. Typically, the
court began by reciting the Supreme Court holding in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust—due process requires a “hearing appropriate to the
case.”21 It then determined the kind of hearing that is “appropriate to the
case” by reciting and applying the three-part test the Supreme Court
announced in Mathews v. Eldridge:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.22

The court then concluded that the interest at stake is important; the failure to
conduct a new oral evidentiary hearing before rejecting a magistrate’s

21
22

339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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finding creates an unacceptably high risk of error; and the cost of conducting
such a hearing is low.23
The result of the application of the first part of the test is undeniably
correct in the context of district court reversal of a magistrate’s proposed
finding where the reversal is likely to result in the conviction and
incarceration of a criminal defendant. The result of application of the third
part of the test is questionable, however, and the result of the application of
the second part of the test is unsupportable.
Courts should recognize that the cost of requiring a district judge to
conduct a new evidentiary hearing before rejecting a magistrate’s proposed
finding is high. Those costs arise in at least two forms—the practical cost of
requiring a busy district judge to conduct a new evidentiary hearing and the
constitutional cost of reducing the district judge’s ability to control the fact
finding process. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that delegation of
the task of making proposed findings to an Article I magistrate violates
Article III based on its belief that “the entire [fact-finding] process takes
place under the district court’s total control . . . .”24 To the extent that
circuit courts render the process of district court rejection of magistrate’s
proposed findings burdensome by conditioning it on the use of costly
23
24

E.g., Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1075-76.
447 U.S. at 681.
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additional procedures, they render inaccurate the assumption that was the
basis for the Supreme Court’s holding that delegation of the process of
making proposed findings to magistrates is consistent with Article III.
The sole justification for the enactment of the Magistrates Act of 1968
and for the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the Act was the wellsupported belief by Congress and the Court that district judges have heavy
caseloads and that conducting hearings to find facts is such a major part of
the burden of deciding cases that district judges should be permitted to
delegate the task of conducting hearings to make proposed findings to
magistrates. Thus, the conclusion of six circuit courts that requiring a district
judge to conduct a new hearing as a prerequisite for rejection of a
magistrate’s proposed finding is a low cost procedure is inconsistent with the
sole justification for delegating the proposed fact-finding process to
magistrates.
The requirement to conduct a new hearing is particularly burdensome
when the hearing must be conducted by a judge other than the judge who is
presiding in the case in which the proposed finding will have substantive
effects, as most circuits require.25 Once a court mandates a new hearing, it is
easy to understand why the court then concludes that the hearing should be
25

E.g., Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. en banc); United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 443
F.3d 138, 148; Cullen v. United States, 194 F.3d 401, 409.
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conducted by a new judge. Judge Chambers has provided a good explanation
for that part of the requirement: “I cannot agree with the concept that a
district judge can accept without hearing . . . a magistrate’s ruling
(recommendation), but he must hold a hearing de novo before he can
reverse. In practice, fair as the judge may be, if he exercises a discretion to
hold a hearing, it will usually mean that he has almost made up his mind to
reverse the magistrate. That is not good.”26
It is hard to disagree with Judge Chambers’ logic. If the legal regime
that governs the relationship between judges and magistrates empowers a
judge to reject a magistrate’s proposed finding if, but only if, the judge
conducts a de novo hearing, the judge’s decision to conduct the hearing is
powerful evidence that he has prejudged the issue of fact that is the sole
reason for the hearing. Thus, if the de novo hearing requirement makes any
sense, the hearing must be conducted by a judge other than the judge who
orders the hearing. That, in turn, makes the de novo hearing requirement
particularly costly. A decision by a district judge to convene a de novo
hearing requires the judge to impose the high cost of conducting such a
hearing on a colleague who already is grappling with his own heavy

26

United States v. Bergera, 512 F.3d 391, 394.
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caseload. That adds to the inherent cost of the de novo hearing additional
costs in the form of friction and resentment between judges.
Even when a judge is confident that a magistrate’s proposed finding is
wrong, he is unlikely to incur the high interpersonal relations cost of
requiring a colleague to conduct a de novo hearing. That understandable
reluctance of district judges to require colleagues to conduct new hearings
when the judge believes that a magistrate’s proposed finding is wrong
undermines the Supreme Court’s assumption that the fact-finding process
“takes place under the district court’s total control” when a district court
delegates the task of making proposed findings to a magistrate. Yet, that
assumption was the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision to hold that
Congress can empower a District Judge to delegate the initial fact finding
process to a Magistrate without violating Article III of the Constitution.
The courts’ error in the application of the Mathews test is even more
apparent in the context of the second part of the test. Each of the circuit
courts that have held that due process requires a de novo hearing as a
prerequisite to rejecting a proposed finding that is favorable to a criminal
defendant has concluded that failure to conduct a de novo hearing creates an
intolerably high cost of error and that conducting a de novo hearing

11

significantly reduces that risk.27 That conclusion, in turn, is based solely on
the assertion that findings made by someone who hears live testimony are
systematically more accurate than findings that are based on a “cold record.”
If an assertion could become true as a result of the frequency with
which it is made, all courts would have to accept the accuracy of this
assertion. Every anglo-american court, including the Supreme Court has
repeatedly distinguished between accurate findings that are based on
observation of the demeanor of witnesses and findings that are unreliable
because they are based on a “cold record.” In Raddatz, the Supreme Court
repeated this assertion and quoted an 1867 opinion of the Privy Council to
support it:

The most careful note must often fail to convey the evidence fully in
some of its most important elements . . . . It cannot give the look or
manner of the witness: his hesitation, his doubts, his variations of
language,

his

confidence

or

precipitancy,

his

calmness

or

consideration; . . . the dead body of the evidence, without its spirit;

27

E.g., United States v. Ridgeway, 300 F.3d 1153, 1155; United States v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303, 1305;
Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1110; United States v. Bergera, 512 F.2d 391, 394.
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which is supplied, when given openly and orally, by the ear and eye of
those who receive it.28

The only problem with this eloquent statement is its totally mythical nature.
The assertion in hundreds of judicial opinions for over a century that live
testimony is more reliable than a “cold record” is inconsistent with an
enormous body of evidence in the social science literature.
Olin Wellborn’s meta-study of the literature on the role of demeanor
in fact-finding led him to conclude:

Psychologists and other students of human communication have
investigated many aspects of deceptive behavior and its detection. As
part of this investigation, they have attempted to determine
experimentally whether ordinary people can effectively use nonverbal
indicia to determine whether another person is lying. In effect, social
scientists have tested the legal premise concerning demeanor as a
scientific hypothesis. With impressive consistency, the experimental
results indicate that this legal premise is erroneous. According to the
empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot make effective use of

28

Queen v. Bertrand, 4 Moo.PC.N.S. 460, 481, 16 Eng. Rep. 391, 397 (1867), quoted at 447 U.S. at 679.
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demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness. On the contrary,
there is some evidence that the observation of demeanor diminishes
rather than enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments.29

William Stuntz has noted that the cases in which courts have required de
novo hearings of magistrate’s proposed findings in order to enhance
accuracy arose in a context in which demeanor is particularly likely to
detract from accuracy and to mislead a judge.30 Police officers are
professional witnesses who have more experience testifying than most
criminal defendants and are more articulate than most criminal defendants.
A judge who concentrates on witness demeanor in making findings in such a
context is likely to discount important factors like context and to believe the
articulate and relaxed testimony of the professional witness when a focus on
context would lead the judge to the opposite conclusion with respect to a
contested issue of fact.
It is time for courts to resign their long-time memberships in the flat
earth society and to recognize in this and many other contexts that demeanor
is worse than worthless as a means of choosing which witnesses to believe.

29

Olin Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 Corn. L. Rev. 1075 (1991). See also Charles Wright, Arthur Miller, Mary
Kane & Richard Marcus, Federal Practice & Procedure §3070.2 (2012); Richard Marcus, Completing
Equity’s Conquest? 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 725, 757-62 (1989).
30
William Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L.Rev. 881, 914 (1991).

14

Demeanor is affirmatively misleading. District court review of magistrates’
proposed findings is a good place to begin. It is indefensible for a court to
hold a statute unconstitutional based on an assertion that is demonstrably
false.

II. The Broad De Novo Hearing Requirement in Thoms Is Unconstitutional

In Thoms, the Ninth Circuit confronted a situation in which a district
judge had rejected a magistrate’s proposed finding that was unfavorable to a
criminal defendant. The court recognized that due process could not support
a requirement that a district judge must conduct a de novo hearing before
rejecting a proposed finding that is unfavorable to the defendant.31 It held,
however, “that a district court abuses its discretion when it reverses a
magistrate’s judge’s credibility determinations, made after receiving live
testimony and favorable to the government, without viewing key demeanor
evidence, . . .”32 The court stated that the right to a de novo hearing is
“shared by all litigants,” presumably including civil litigants as well as the
government.33 The court supported its broadening of the de novo hearing
requirement to apply to all litigants by referring to the ancient myths that
31

684 F.3d at 902.
Id. at 903.
33
Id. at 900.
32
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“live testimony is the bedrock of the search for truth;” “where an unresolved
factual dispute exists, demeanor evidence is a significant factor in judging
credibility;” and, resolution of factual disputes on a “cold record” detracts
from accuracy in the fact-finding process.34 The court referred to no
evidence to support its assertions. There is no such evidence. The court
could support its mythical assertions only by quoting similar assertions made
in the past by other members of the flat earth society.
The broad holding in Thoms is inconsistent with the “unmistakeable”
congressional intent not to require de novo hearings that the Supreme Court
recognized in Raddatz.35 The Thoms court claimed the power to trump that
decision of Congress based on its “supervisory authority ‘to mandate
procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice
although in no wise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.’”36 That
does not work. The supervisory power of the courts is independent of
statutes, but it is inferior to the legislative power of Congress. Thus, while a
court does not need a statutory source of power to require a lower court to

34

Id. at 903-04.
447 U.S. at 676.
36
684 F.3d at 903.
35
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adopt a particular procedure, it cannot exercise its “supervisory power” in a
manner that is inconsistent with a statute.37
A court can order a lower court to act in a manner that is inconsistent
with a statute only if it concludes that the statute is unconstitutional. The
Thoms court did not even attempt to make the case that the congressional
command to allow a district judge to engage in de novo review, rather than a
de novo hearing, to make a decision to accept, amend, or reverse a
magistrate’s proposed finding that is favorable to the government violates
the Constitution. There is no conceivable theory on which a court could hold
the Magistrates Act unconstitutional in the context of an action by a district
judge that is unfavorable to the government in a criminal case.
The Thoms court’s attempt to use its supervisory power to trump a
statute violates Article I by usurping power that is conferred exclusively on
Congress. It also violates Article III. If a district judge is prohibited from
rejecting a proposed finding by a magistrate without requiring a colleague to
conduct a new hearing in every context in any criminal or civil case, it
simply cannot be said that the fact-finding process remains in a “district
court’s total control” when a district judge delegates the task of making a
37

The Supreme Court has recognized the legislative supremacy of Congress in many cases. See, e.g.
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court . . . must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”) For a detailed discussion of legislative supremacy, see Daniel Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 281 (1989).
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proposed finding to a magistrate. Yet, that was one of the critical predicates
for the Supreme Court’s decision in Raddatz to reject the argument that the
Magistrates Act violates Article III.38 Once that predicate is eliminated, the
delegation of the power to make proposed findings of fact in the Magistrates
Act cannot survive an Article III challenge.

III. A Broad Restriction on the Power of District Judges to Reject
Proposed Findings by Magistrates Is Inconsistent with Core Administrative
Law Doctrines

In Raddatz, all of the Justices agreed that cases in which the Court has
determined the permissible relationship between agency hearing officers and
agencies and between agencies and courts are “relevant” to the process of
determining the permissible relationship between magistrates and district
judges.39 The Justices then placed heavy reliance on the principle announced
in the Court’s 1936 opinion in Morgan v. United States that “the one who
decides must hear.”40

38

447 U.S. at 681.
447 U.S. at 680, 696-711.
40
298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936), quoted at 447 U.S. at 677, 696. The Raddatz Court also relied heavily on
another obsolete administrative law doctrine—the requirement that a court must engage in de novo review
of agency findings of constitutional fact, announced in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S.
38 (1936), cited at 447 U.S. at 683, 709-10. The demise of the constitutional fact doctrine is described in
39
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That principle has long been obsolete.41 It is inconsistent with the
basic characteristics of the administrative state that have existed for decades
and that have been enshrined in numerous Supreme Court opinions. In its
1951 opinion in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,42 the Court upheld the
decision of Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act to empower
agencies to substitute their findings for those of an Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) even though the ALJ heard the evidence and the agency
decision maker did not.43 In its 1955 opinion in FCC v. Allentown
Broadcasting Corp,44 the Court reversed a circuit court opinion in which the
circuit court had held that an agency is bound to accept the findings of an
ALJ when they are based on demeanor. The Court held that, while an agency
must consider the ALJ’s findings in making its findings, it can make
findings that are inconsistent with the ALJ’s findings without conducting a
de novo hearing even when the ALJ’s findings were based on the ALJ’s
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses.45
Courts routinely uphold agency findings that are inconsistent with
ALJ findings where the ALJ heard the testimony and made a finding based
detail in Richard Pierce, Sidney Shapiro & Paul Verkuil, Administrative Law & Process §5.2.2 (5 th ed.
2009).
41
The demise of the rule announced in the 1936 opinion in Morgan is described in detail in Richard Pierce,
Administrative Law Treatise §8.6 (5th ed. 2010).
42
340 U.S. 474 (1951).
43
Id. at 492-94.
44
349 U.S. 358 (1955).
45
Id. at 364-65. For a detailed discussion of Allentown, see Pierce, supra. note 41 at §11.2.
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on demeanor and the agency decision maker did not hear the evidence. 46 In
such a common situation, the court upholds the agency finding as long as the
agency explains why it made a finding that differs from the ALJ’s finding.47
Courts should use administrative law cases as an aid to determining the
permissible relationship between magistrates and district judges, as the
Supreme Court did in Raddatz.48 Courts should use modern cases, rather
than obsolete old cases, for that purpose, however. There is a near perfect
analogy between the relationship between ALJs and agencies, on the one
hand, and between magistrates and district judges on the other. In both
contexts, Congress conferred on a superior institution the power to reject
findings proposed by a subordinate to whom the superior delegated the task
of initial fact-finding without holding a new evidentiary hearing. In both
contexts, courts should uphold that congressional decision.

IV. Courts Should Uphold District Court Decisions to Reject Proposed
Findings by Magistrates Without Conducting a New Hearing If the Judge
Gives Adequate Reasons for the Decision

46

E.g., Long v. Social Security Administration, 635 F.3d 526, 530-31 (Fed Cir. 2011). For discussion of
scores of similar cases, see Pierce, supra. note 41 at §11.2.
47
E.g., Leatherbury v. Dep’t of Army, 524 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008). For discussion of scores of similar
cases, see Pierce, supra. note 41 at 11.2.
48
447 U.S. at 680, 696-711.
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Cases like Universal Camera and Allentown Broadcasting provide a
good framework for determining the permissible relationship between
magistrates and district judges. A district judge should have the discretion to
reject a finding proposed by a magistrate without conducting a new hearing
if, but only if, the judge provides an adequate explanation for his decision.
Two of the circuit court opinions that address the relationship between
magistrates and district judges illustrate well the way this legal regime
should work in the context of district court review of magistrate’s proposed
findings.
Ironically, Thoms is both the case in which the Ninth Circuit expanded
the scope of its de novo hearing requirement to cover all litigants and a case
that illustrates particularly well the circumstances in which a circuit court
should uphold a district judge’s rejection of a magistrate’s proposed finding
without conducting a new hearing. In Thoms, a policeman testified that he
had probable cause to search a house based on his detection of the smell of
marijuana emanating from the house as he drove past at a distance of 400 to
600 feet.49 Seven witnesses testified for the defendant.50 All maintained that
it was impossible for anyone to smell marijuana in those circumstances,
given the defendant’s use of a sophisticated combination of insulation and
49
50

684 F.3d at 896.
Id. at 897.
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filtration.51 The witnesses for the defendant included Professor Richard
Doty, Director of the Smell and Taste Center of the University of
Pennsylvania School of Medicine.52 Professor Doty explained in detail why
it is impossible for anyone to detect the smell of marijuana at a distance of
400 to 600 feet from a house, given the use of the insulation and filtration
system installed in the house.53
The magistrate proposed a finding that the officer smelled the
marijuana as he drove past the house and, thus, had probable cause to
conduct the search. He relied on the officer’s demeanor as the basis for his
finding. The district judge explained in detail why he disagreed with the
magistrate’s proposed finding:

To conclude that Investigator Young did smell marijuana from the
road, while in his vehicle would require the court to assume that
Thoms' filtration system was either saturated or not functional; that
the odor of marijuana left the outbuilding unfiltered and remained
warm long enough to stay above the vegetation behind the Thomses'
house; that it either traveled around the Thomses' two-story residence
or stayed warm long enough to traverse above it then suddenly
51

Id. at 898.
Id. at 897.
53
Id. at 898.
52
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dropped in the area Young claimed to smell marijuana; and that it
followed the described 450 foot course without dispersing beyond
perceptible levels. Those assumptions are contrary to a preponderance
of the evidence presented at the Franks hearing.54

The judge explained that he did not need to conduct a new hearing because:

[T]his court has had access to a transcript of the original evidentiary
hearing and has explained at length [in the previously quoted order]
how the evidence presented renders it highly improbable (indeed, it
seems to this court in light of all the evidence, virtually impossible)
that Investigator Young could smell the marijuana grow under the
circumstances that existed at the time. That conclusion would not
change simply because this court heard the evidence all over again.
The issue here does not turn on the demeanor of the witnesses, but
rather on the implausibility of the officer's conclusion that he smelled
the marijuana grow inside a sealed building at least 450 feet away,
which was screened by forest vegetation and a hill with a house on it.
These considerations, which are paramount in rendering Young's
54

Id. at 898. For the complete detailed opinion of the district judge, see United States v. Thoms, 788
F.Supp. 1001 (D. Alaska 2011).
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conclusion unbelievable, are either derived directly from or are
entirely consistent with Investigator Young's own testimony. It would
serve no purpose but delay to conduct a second hearing to hear the
testimony all over again.55

Any court would uphold as adequate the district judge’s reasons for
rejecting the magistrate’s proposed finding if it were an agency’s rejection of
a finding made by an ALJ. There is no good reason for a court to find those
reasons inadequate in the analogous context of a district judge’s rejection of
a magistrate’s proposed finding. The only reason given by the Ninth
Circuit—that a finding based on a “cold record” is inherently less accurate
than a finding made by someone who observed the demeanor of the
witnesses56—is poppycock that is inconsistent with every empirical study of
demeanor.57
The facts and reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Marshall58 provide a stark contrast with the facts and reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit in Thoms. In Marshall, a magistrate conducted a hearing to
determine whether customs officers had probable cause to search a vessel

55

684 F.3d at 903-04.
Id. at 904.
57
See sources cited in note 29 supra.
58
609 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1980).
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and whether the operator of the vessel had consented to the search.59 The
magistrate proposed findings that the officers lacked probable cause and that
the operator had not consented to the search.60 He filed a report with the
district judge in which he explained his proposed findings with reference to
the evidence presented at the hearing.61 The district judge rejected the
magistrate’s proposed findings without conducting a new hearing, without
reading the transcript of the hearing before the magistrate, and without
giving reasons for rejecting the magistrate’s proposed findings. 62
The Fifth Circuit held that a district judge need not conduct a de novo
hearing before acting on a finding proposed by a magistrate.63 The court also
held, however, that a district judge cannot reject a proposed finding without
first reading the transcript of the hearing, providing counsel for both sides an
opportunity “to point out by memorandum or brief, whatever in the evidence
each deems important to the judge’s ruling,” finding in the transcript “an
articulable basis for rejecting the magistrate’s original resolution of
credibility,” and stating his reasons for rejecting the magistrate’s proposed
finding so that the circuit court can determine whether they are adequate.64
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The holding in Marshall is eminently sensible—a judge must provide
adequate reasons for rejecting a magistrate’s proposed findings. The
Marshall opinion created a legal regime that mirrors the approach courts
have taken for decades in reviewing agency decisions to reject ALJ findings.
All circuits should adopt that approach.
Unfortunately six circuits have instead renewed their memberships in
the flat earth society by prohibiting district judges from rejecting a
magistrate’s proposed finding that is favorable to a criminal defendant
without conducting a new hearing based on the unsupportable assertion that
observation of the demeanor of witnesses enhances the accuracy of factfinding. In Thoms, the Ninth Circuit broadened that holding to cover any
proposed finding by a magistrate that is favorable to any litigant in a
criminal or civil case.

Even the Fifth Circuit abandoned its eminently

sensible holding in Marshall in favor of the mindless and unsupportable
holding that a district judge can not reject a proposed finding that is
favorable to a criminal defendant based on a “cold record.”65 It is time for
circuit judges and Supreme Court Justices to resign their memberships in the
flat earth society by refraining from basing decisions on assertions about the
value of demeanor evidence that are contradicted by all of the available
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scientific evidence. Courts should apply to the relationship between
magistrates and district judges the legal regime they have long applied to the
analogous relationship between ALJs and agency decision makers.
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